Bostock v. Clayton County: Title VII Protections for LGBTQ Employees

In the landmark Bostock v. Clayton County, No. 17–1618, 590 U.S. ___ (2020), the Supreme Court held that an employer who fires an individual for being gay or transgender violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Facts

In each of three consolidated cases, an employer fired an employee at least in part for being 

homosexual or transgender. Clayton County, Georgia, fired Gerald Bostock for conduct “unbecoming” a county employee when began playing a gay recreational softball league. Altitude Express fired Donald Zarda days after he mentioned being gay. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes fired Aimee Stephens, who presented as a male when she was hired, after she informed the company that she planned to “live and work full-time as a woman.” 

Each employee sued, alleging sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The employees’ cases shared a common theory: that Title VII’s prohibition of workplace discrimination “because of sex” prohibited discrimination because an employee is homosexual or transgender. Their respective Circuit Courts reached conflicting conclusions. The Eleventh Circuit allowed the dismissal of Bostock’s suit, holding that Title VII does not prohibit employers from firing employees for being gay. The Second and Sixth Circuits, however, allowed Zarda’s and Stephens’ sex discrimination claims, respectively, to proceed under Title VII. 

Read about the court’s decision at TimCoffieldAttorney.com.

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Corning Glass Works v. Brennan: EPA Law Requires Equal Pay for Equal Work

In Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974), the Supreme Court addressed the allocation of proof in pay discrimination claims under the Equal Pay Act of 1963. This was the first Supreme Court decision applying the Equal Pay Act. The Court held that to prevail on an EPA claim, the plaintiff must prove that the employer pays an employee of the one sex more than it pays an employee of the other sex for substantially equal work. The opinion addressed what it meant for two employees to perform “substantially equal work” for the purposes of the Equal Pay Act, including what it means for work to be performed under “similar working conditions.”

Facts

Corning was a glassworks company. It employed night shift inspectors and day shift inspectors at its plants. For many years, Corning allowed only men to work the night shift, and it paid night shift inspectors more than it paid the day shift inspectors, who were women. In June 1966, three years after the passage of the Equal Pay Act, Corning began opening the night shift jobs to women, allowing female employees to apply for the higher-paid night inspection jobs on an equal seniority basis with men.  

In January 1969, Corning implemented a new “job evaluation” system for setting wage rates. Under that pay system, all subsequently-hired inspectors were to receive the same base wage (which was higher than the previous night shift rate) regardless of sex or shift. With respect to employees hired before the new pay system went into effect, however, the pay plan provided that those employees who worked the night shift would continue to receive a higher (“red circle”) rate. Because of this “red circle” rate, the new pay system perpetuated the previous difference in base pay between day and night inspectors, thereby also perpetuating the previous disparity in pay between female (day) inspectors and male (night) inspectors. 

The Equal Pay Act prohibits an employer from paying different wages to employees of opposite sexes “for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions,” except where the difference in payment is made pursuant to a seniority or merit system or one measuring earnings by quantity or quality of production, or where the differential is “based on any other factor other than sex.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)

The Secretary of Labor brought suit, asserting that Corning’s pay practices violated the EPA by paying male and female inspectors differently for equal work. 

To read the full article, visit TimCoffieldAttorney.com.